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Abstract
The Netherlands is heavily dependent on the success of carbon capture and storage (CCS) for its decarbonisation 
policy. This paper discusses several ways how CCS in the Dutch power sector can be stimulated after the round of 
demonstration activities up to 2015. It describes recent policy developments in the UK, US and Germany, and 
concludes that a policy package could be the most useful way forward if it includes a financial incentive to cover 
additional costs of CCS. The costs of financial support could amount to 1-3% of the Dutch electricity bill, even with 
CO2 prices in the €20-50 range until 2030. A policy package could also include a regulatory instrument like an 
emissions performance standard (EPS) or other regulation for new coal-fired power plants to provide additional 
certainty. The EU Treaty explicitly leaves room for more stringent regulation from Member States required to 
protect the environment. 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
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1. Introduction
CO2 capture and storage technology is anticipated to play an important role in the Dutch climate mitigation 
portfolio. CCS may be able to reduce emissions in the Netherlands by tens of megatons per year. A scenario might 
be the capture of 4-10 Mt CO2 per year in the Netherlands by 2020 and up to 80-100 Mt in 2050 [1]. It follows that 
effective technology policies are required to advance the timely introduction and diffusion of CCS technologies. 
This is particularly important in view of plans tabled in the last few years for the construction of five new coal 
plants in the Netherlands, adding up to an additional 5.5 GW and giving rise to concerns about increasing CO2
emissions. Therefore, the ambition from the Dutch government to link up to international efforts and realize CO2
capture and storage (CCS) technology has been substantiated. 
In the Dutch Clean and Efficient program two CCS demonstrations were foreseen [2], and the Dutch government 
has committed to contributing financially to at least one of them. More policies were announced in the June 2009 
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Policy Letter to the Dutch Lower House [3]. Policies should contribute to meeting as much as five preconditions 
including:
 Decrease of the costs of CO2 capture technology
 Effective organization of CO2 infrastructure and storage
 Sufficient legal underpinning of responsibility and liability
 Safeguarding of potential storage locations
 Adequate financial support.
Furthermore, safety and communication and public participation were named as important issues to address. The
policy letter made reference to early investment subsidies for CCS demonstrations. From the European Economic 
Recovery Plan [3] 180 M€ was reserved for a CCS demonstration from Eon and Electrabel in the Rijnmond area. 
Furthermore, 300 Mt emission allowance units have been made available for twelve demonstrations of CCS or 
innovative renewable energy in the EU, and it is anticipated that a CCS demonstration in the Netherlands will be 
among those twelve. 
Apart from these early investments, the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced an initial assessment of 
measures to stimulate CCS alongside the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). In her November letter, the 
Minister announced ‘some kind of legal obligation’ to ensure that CO2 capture and storage will be applied in the 
Netherlands, alongside the EU ETS [4]. Indeed, the EU ETS has been advocated widely as the prime instrument for 
advancing CCS. It has been designed as an instrument to reduce GHG emissions cost-effectively and as such has 
gained widespread support. Recently however, doubts were raised within both the public and private sector 
concerning the effectiveness of the EU ETS in its current form as an instrument to also induce long term 
technological change, because the CO2 price level so far has been low and volatile and because a perspective on a 
high and stable CO2 price is still lacking. Sceptics argue that the ubiquitous availability of low cost abatement 
options in EU ETS sectors against a background of low CO2 price levels holds back investors from making early 
investments in immature technologies, such as CO2 capture and storage. Indeed, with a project cost of CCS from
coal-based capacity of around 48 €/tCO2 in 2020 and a CO2 price on the order of 30 €/tCO2 [1], the EU ETS indeed 
does not provide an effective signal to invest in CCS. 
Consequently, a major point of debate concerns the question how to ensure investor confidence, and which 
complementary policies besides the EU ETS may be applied to stimulate the implementation of CCS, in particular 
during its pre-commercialisation phase. Both regulation-based policies and financial instruments have been 
advocated to help avoid a lock-in in carbon intensive technologies. The first group includes instruments such as a 
CCS mandate or an emissions performance standard (EPS) at the plant level, while examples of the latter are a feed-
in subsidy or tariff or a tender system. The United Kingdom and the United States are active players in the 
formulation of proposals for effective incentives for CCS. In these countries CCS policies combine both carrot and 
stick, including financial and regulatory instruments. Initial assessments of various instruments have been carried 
out in a number of studies [1,4,5].
This study intends to contribute to a debate on regulations and incentives in possible integrated policy package 
for CCS in the Netherlands. It describes possible implications of different pathways for the roll-out of CCS in the 
Netherlands. By means of modeling, indicative illustrations of possible outcomes will be provided. In particular, the 
following questions are addressed:
 What are current developments in the UK, the US and Germany regarding the introduction of 
complementary policies for CCS? (Section 2);
 What pathways for the roll-out of CCS in the Netherlands may be foreseen (Section 3)?
 What would these pathways imply for the export of Dutch electricity and for wholesale electricity prices 
(Section 4)?
 What would be the cost of financial support for CCS in the Netherlands (Section 5)? 
 What restrictions does the EU legal framework pose against the introduction of complementary policies 
for CCS in the Netherlands (Section 6)?
The paper ends with a number of policy relevant conclusions (Section 7). 
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2. Policy developments in the UK, the US and Germany 
Various countries have introduced policies for advancing CCS, or have an ongoing debate on the matter. 
The United Kingdom is a front-runner in this respect. The UK government has started up a range of initiatives to 
speed up introduction and deployment of the technology. These initiatives include regulation and financial 
incentives. It is required to demonstrate CCS for each new coal plant on at least 300 MW of its net capacity. These 
demonstrations can be funded by a levy. The UK government proposed that new coal-fired power stations should be 
required to retrofit CCS to their full capacity within a period of five years in which CCS has been independently 
assessed economically and technically proven. This review will take place in 2018 and should involve a broader 
assessment of the status of CCS and its role in decarbonisation of the electricity mix. A final decision on specificity 
of the regulation for retrofitting – EPS or CCS mandate – has not been taken.
The United States introduced legislation at State level, mostly on the West coast but also in Illinois which is more 
dependent on coal. A generic type of regulation, such as an EPS, is preferred. Regulation will have a gradual effect, 
which makes it more acceptable for industries. Some states with coal interests have adopted a package approach in 
the expectation that this might present an economic opportunity. At federal level several approaches are being 
discussed, i.e. different types of cap and trade systems, but no final decision has been taken. The Environment 
Protection Agency (EPA) has taken the first steps towards standards based on ‘best available control technology’, 
but the details are not clear yet and long legal battles are anticipated.
Germany is hesitant about pursuing specific CCS measures for several reasons. Renewable energy and nuclear 
energy dominate the political agenda. The federal government has to take different regional interests, e.g. the future 
of coal, storage in backyards, into account.
3. Pathways for the roll-out of CCS in the Netherlands
The rate of at which CCS will be introduced in the Netherlands will depend on the development of the CO2 price, 
cost reductions (notably for CO2 capture), and incentivizing policies, apart from possible negative public 
perceptions. The implications of different rates of introductions for wholesale electricity prices have been analysed 
on the basis of five pathways for the roll-out of CCS against a reference scenario. The reference scenario is based on 
the new reference projection for the Dutch government [6, 6B]1 and includes both existing and newly planned 
energy policies. The CO2 price is assumed 20 euro/ton until 2020, increasing to a level of 40 and 50 euro/ton in 
2030 and 2040 respectively. Such CO2 prices will not be sufficient to make CCS an economically viable option. 
Earlier estimates of ECN [12, 13] indicate that a CO2 price of 60 to 90 €/ton of  CO2 would be needed for CCS in 
power generation in the time frame up to 2020-2025.
  One of the pathways was assumed to reflect the developments of an EPS of 350 g/kWh without any financial 
support. It was argued and illustrated by electricity market model analyses that without any financial support such an 
EPS will lead to a shift to gas and to a ‘de facto’ immediate closure of coal-based capacity. For the other pathways it 
was assumed that the coverage of the financial gap by a financial incentive is sufficient to deploy carbon capture to 
various degrees.
In each of the pathways with financial support, assumptions have been made on the extent of CCS deployment on 
new coal or new gas.  The amount of CCS deployed in terms of MWe (net) is given in Error! Reference source not 
found.. For all cases, it has been assumed that:
 No CCS on old coal (built and operated before 2010) will occur.
 No CCS retrofit on old and new gas operated before 2020 will occur.
 Existing coal-fired plants will be decommissioned gradually.
1 Details on this new reference projection and the CCS deployment schemes are given in another contribution to this 
Conference [7]
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Table 1. CCS deployed in MWe in Dutch power generation (net)
2015 2020 2025 2030 Remarks
Reference projection 200 200 200 200 Only 1 demo in 2015-2020
0 Only EPS 1 200 0 0 0
1 Slow Coal (SC) 2 200 980 1680 3080 Only 1 demo in 2015, All retrofit on new coal built in 
2012-2015, in phases. 
2 Fast Coal (FC) 2 400 1680 4080 5080 2 demos in 2015, retrofit on new coal built in 2012-2015, 
and on additional new coal 2025-2030
3 Slow Coal Gas (SCG) 2 200 980 1680 4080 Only 1 demo in 2015 
All retrofit on new coal built in 2012-2015, in phases. 
CCS on 1000 MW new gas in 2030
4 Fast Coal Gas (FCG) 2 400 1680 5080 7080 2 demos in 2015, retrofit on new coal built in 2012-2015, 
and on additional new coal 2025-2030
CCS on 1000 MW new gas in 2025, and on new 2000 
MW gas in 2030
1 Environmental Performance Standard (EPS) of  350 g/kWh; no financial support
2 Assuming sufficient financial support is available. The 350 gram/kWh is not necessarily met for all cases. The various pathways consider the 
context and ‘realism’ of the original reference projection. Energy penalties reduce for plants that deploy CCS later on.
If the demonstration activities have proven CCS to be reliable (technically and the energy penalty has decreased), 
if other crucial aspects have been solved (safety and other aspects of transport and storage) and if CCS has proved to 
be socially acceptable – if all these conditions have been met, the introduction of CCS is mainly a financial issue.
Still, there may be good reason to introduce some form of regulation in the form of a CCS mandate or an emissions 
performance standard. Not only has the Dutch government already announced that it would introduce some kind of 
legal obligation. This would provide a stronger legitimation for CCS investment decisions in board rooms and thus 
create more certainty. 
4. Implications for the wholesale market price of electricity and export
For electricity prices and export effects 5-year averages have been given in Table 1 below. In the ‘Only EPS’ 
case, i.e. without any additional national financial support, the wholesale market electricity prices increase by about 
10% compared to the reference scenario. This will also have an increasing effect on end user prices in the 
Netherlands. There is hardly any noticeable effect for the four pathways with the financial support to compensate for 
the higher costs. The changes in the merit order appear to be negligible as to the impact on the wholesale electricity 
prices. The main reason is that new coal with CCS will have variable costs of production substantially lower than 
the average wholesale electricity market prices.The main reason is the lower CO2 costs and despite of the higher 
coal cost (energy penalty) and less net electricity production.
Table 1 Average wholesale market electricity price, the Netherlands1
[€/MWh] 2015 2020 2025
Reference 58.8 60.5 63.3
0 Only EPS 58.8 64.5 1 70.0
1 SC 58.8 60.4 63.6
2 FC 58.8 60.7 63.4
3 SCG 58.8 60.4 64.0
4 FCG 58.8 60.7 63.4
1 For electricity prices effects, the 5-year averages around the indicated 'midpoint' year have been given. 
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Following this price increase, the net export volume decreases considerably over the reference scenario (Table 2). 
This extreme case worsens the competitive position of the Dutch power production. There is hardly any noticeable 
effect for the four pathways with financial support. In the period 2015 to 2030, small increases of no more than 1.5 
TWh are observed. The reason for the small differences is the assumption that producers are compensated for the 
higher cost in the case of CCS deployment. Note that during the years 2000-2008, the Netherlands was a net 
importer of electricity (between 15-20 TWh on a yearly basis). 
Table 2 Net export from NL to neighbouring countries, in TWh 1
2015 2020 2025
Reference 15.6 15.2 24.7
0 Only EPS 15.6 9.3 12.6
1 SC 16.2 16.7 25.1
2 FC 16.4 16.4 24.8
3 SCG 16.2 16.7 25.1
4 FCG 16.4 16.4 24.9
1 For export effects, the 5-year averages around the indicated 'midpoint' year have been given. 
To sum up, without any national financial support, the wholesale market electricity prices increases by about 10 
per cent. As a result end user prices in the Netherlands will also increase. Without financial support to CCS the net 
export will decrease considerably. Instead of some 15 TWh (2020) to 25 TWh (2025), it could amount to half of 
that, i.e. 9 to 13 TWh. In a policy package with financial support the price will not increase and exports will not 
decrease – effectively the financial support only drives this result.
5. Cost of policies
The introduction of CCS comes at a cost, most likely to be covered by both industry and government. In order to 
estimate the magnitude of the total cost, it is insightful to calculate the financial gap. Assuming a cost of electricity 
production by coal with CCS of 78 €/MWh, and an average wholesale market electricity price of about 61 €/MWh 
(with 20 €/ton CO2) , the financial gap would be 17 €/MWh. With 20% co-firing of biomass, the gap would be 23 
€/MWh Table 3 shows the magnitude of the financial gap for different production cost levels and wholesale market 
prices, for coal with CCS in the Slow Coal pathway, both without biomass and with 20% cofiring. The results 
indicate that CCS becomes economically viable for CO2 prices between 70 and 80 €/ton CO2 (in the context of the 
reference scenario).
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Table 3 Financial gap for coal with CCS, with different CO2 prices, in the Slow Coal pathway (indicative and for illustration only)
Cost of electricity[€/MWh]
Wholesale 
market price 
(avg)
[€/MWh]
Financial gap
[€/MWh]
CO2 price
[€/ton]
100% coal
with CCS
80% coal, 20% biomass 
with CCS
100% coal
with CCS
80% coal, 20% biomass
with CCS
78 (default) 84 61 17 23 20
81 82 71 10 21 50
82 81 76 8 5 60
83 80 81 2 - 1 70
84 79 86 - 2 - 7 80
Table 4 Total ‘electricity bill’ based on wholesale market prices
2020 2025 2030
TWh, total demand 128.3 128.7 131.0
average price, €/MWh 61 63 67
Total, M€ 7763 8140 8838
The cumulative financial gap can be compared to the overall ‘electricity bill’ based on domestic electricity 
demand and the average wholesale electricity price. This total electricity bill ranges from almost 8 billion € in 2020 
to 9 billion € in 2030 in the reference scenario (Table 4), while electricity produced in coal-fired plants with CCS in 
the ‘Slow Coal& Gas pathway increases threefold between 2020 and 2030. The cumulative financial gap related to 
these production levels is only a few percent of the total electricity bill (Table 5). 
Table 5 Cumulative financial gap for coal with CCS in the Slow Coal & Gas pathway (100% coal, so no biomass co-firing)
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
Electricity from 
coal+ CCS 6.0 TWh 9.2 TWh 18.0 TWh 6.0 TWh 9.2 TWh 18.0 TWh
CO2 price
[€/t CO2]
Cumulative financial gap
[M€/yr] % of total ' electricity bill'
20 103 157 305 1.3% 1.9% 3.5%
50 60 92 180 0.8% 1.1% 2.0%
60 48 74 144 0.6% 0.9% 1.6%
70 12 18 36 0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
80 - 12 - 18 - 36 - 0.2% - 0.2% - 0.4%
6. Comparison of financial instruments
Various policy instruments may be used to fill the financial gap, including feed-in tariffs or premiums, a contract 
for difference, or a tender system. Stimulating CCS in the Netherlands with a feed-in scheme, notably when based 
on an (additional) premium, has the advantage that the instrument could be linked to the existing scheme for 
renewable energy, the Stimulering Duurzame Energie (SDE). In the medium term, feed-in premiums may therefore 
be the preferred instrument for reducing the financial risk of a CCS operation. On the downside, it requires 
processing possibly biased cost information from industry by the state, it involves the risk of excessive profits 
should CO2 and fossil fuel prices be lower respectively higher than anticipated, and it may render the energy sector 
dependent on subsidies. 
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A contract for difference on the contrary will not require evaluation by the state of possibly underestimated cost 
information. It would however require the introduction of an entirely new policy instrument, which possibly will 
involve higher transaction costs and most likely give rise to questions as to why a dedicated instrument would be 
required for CCS and not for other abatement technologies. 
A tender system has an intermediate position. It is being used widely in Dutch energy policy, and competition 
will discourage project developers to overestimate costs. It will involve a minor risk of windfall profits in case fossil 
fuel prices are lower than anticipated, and require efforts from a state agency to evaluate the project. 
However, the three new coal-fired power plants that will be addressed by a financial instrument are technically 
comparable and therefore the costs will not differ much. Hence, an approach that is comparable with the SDE 
system for renewable energy (feed-in premium) might be an alternative for a tender system at this stage already. In 
any case, it seems wise to look at a simple approach for these three coal-fired power plants. More sophisticated 
approaches could be considered for next steps, also taking into account the learning experiences of other countries.
7. Restrictions of the EU legal framework 
The EU Treaty leaves room for national measures on top of EU policies that would be required to protect the 
environment. It will therefore probably not constitute an obstacle for national CCS policies. Most likely, the UK 
government will want to refer to this article in the Treaty should UK regulatory policy be challenged from a legal 
perspective. This will most probably be done as the IPPC Directive has been codified in January 2008 in which a 
relevant article states: “Where emissions of a greenhouse gas from an installation are specified in Annex I to 
Directive 2003/87/EC […] the permit shall not include an emission limit value for direct emissions of that gas 
unless it is necessary to ensure that no significant local pollution is caused.”. A proposal by the European 
Commission for a Directive on industrial emissions contains similar language. This seems to exclude the possibility 
of introducing an EPS. However, at the same time the Directive for Geological Storage of CO2 explicitly opens a 
perspective on an EU wide emissions performance standard by 2015.
All in all, the legal situation is uncertain. The EU Treaty leaves room for national laws that are stricter than the 
European standard. One Directive mentions an EPS explicitly, but another one prohibits including CO2 in permits. 
Thus, it could be argued that a case for a stricter national approach can be made. A situation in which a financial 
package fully or partially compensates for the cost differential with unabated fossil fuel has to be accepted by the 
European Commission, but again a case can be made.
8. Concluding remarks
In this paper the implications of different pathways for advancing CCS in the Netherlands were discussed,
enabled by financial and possibly regulatory policies. Financial instruments may include a financial gap policy, a 
tender system, or a contract for difference, while a regulatory instrument could be an emissions performance 
standard or a CCS mandate. Without any financial support regulatory instruments are likely to enforce a shift to 
natural gas or a higher share of biomass co-firing, rather than advancing CCS. Financial support on the contrary will 
help to spark off investments in CCS. It will compensate for the difference between the costs of electricity from 
unabated coal and electricity from coal and CCS, without giving rise to an increase of the wholesale electricity price.
Obviously, financial support will have budgetary implications, also when it is relatively modest. Indicatively, it
could be comparable to 1 to 3 per cent of the total wholesale electricity bill, even if CO2 prices remain in the € 20-50 
range in the period 2020-2030. Based upon assumptions in this paper, the cumulative financial gap would be in the 
range of € 100 million in 2020 (with a CO2 price of €20 and 6 TWh) to € 180 million in 2030 (18 TWh, with a CO2
price of €50). With other fuel and CO2 prices, and other levels of CCS deployment these amounts would be 
different. These costs could be financed either from a share of the auction revenue of CO2 allowances paid by 
electricity generators and/or a small levy on the electricity price, either on the wholesale price or on end user prices.
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If the government wants to give a clear indication about its vision on the future of electricity production and 
decarbonisation a package it may prefer to include regulation as well. Regulatory instruments alongside financial 
support may provide more certainty on the long-term character of CCS policies. A CCS mandate may be a better 
guarantee that investments are directed towards CCS but it is difficult to imagine a CCS mandate when this 
technology is still in the demonstration phase. An Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) would allow greater 
flexibility, and may initially be on the order of 350 g/kWh. A lower standard might be difficult to defend, since in 
that case coal plants would need to be even cleaner than modern gas-fired plants. Although the IPPC Directive 
forbids an emission limit for direct emissions from greenhouse gases, the EU Treaty explicitly leaves room for 
stricter regulations by Member States that would be required to protect the environment.
Policies stimulating CCS will only influence the overall CO2 emission if they are combined with a reduction of 
the EU-ETS cap. Theoretically, strong arguments can be made against a combination of the existing ETS cap on the 
one hand and regulation on the other [8]. If the ETS cap is not adjusted, an EPS next to the EU ETS will not further 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions covered by the trading scheme, since emissions are set by the cap. Moreover, an 
EPS may reduce the demand for emission allowances and, hence, lowers the price for these allowances. Thus, the 
incentive for all other installations not covered by the regulation may be reduced. To counter this effect, the cap has 
to be decreased in combination with the regulation.
Any policy package for CCS in the Netherlands, whether or not including regulation alongside financial support, 
would need to be evaluated timely, e.g. by 2018. This would be after the review by the European Commission of the 
Storage Directive, and would allow for taking experience with the first CCS demonstrations. At that moment the 
prospects of CCS in gas-fired power stations and an eventual stricter EPS for coal-fired power stations at a later 
moment could be considered as well. Thus, a successful roll-out of CCS on the longer term may be ensured.
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